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Abstract
This paper develops a model of cultural transmission where television plays a central
role for socialization. Parents split their free time between educating their children which is
costly and watching TV which though entertaining might socialize the children to the wrong
trait. The free to air television industry maximizes advertisement revenue. We show that TV
watching is increasing in cultural coverage, cost of education, TVs entertainment value and
decreasing in the perceived cultural distance between the two traits. A monopolistic television
industry captures all TV watching by both groups if the perceived cultural distance between
groups is small relative to the TVs entertainment value. Otherwise, more coverage will be
given to the most protable group where protability increases in group size, advertisement
sensitivity and perceived cultural distance. This leads to two possible steady states where one
group is larger but both groups survive in the long run. Competition in the media industry
might lead to cultural extinction but only if one group is very insensitive to advertisement
and not radical enough not to watch TV. We briey discuss the existing evidence for the
empirical predictions of the model.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the study of cultural transmission of preferences has mushroomed.1 In this literature
cultural transmission is conceptualized as resulting from two forces: direct vertical socialization
from parents to children and oblique and horizontal socialization by society at large. Although
television has become the primary source of socialization in many modern societies (Gerbner
et al. (2002)) its role as an oblique socialization mechanism2 has been ignored in the cultural
transmission literature despite the existing evidence that television can change cultural traits and
beliefs. Systematic empirical studies have revealed for example that the introduction of cable
television changed womens status in rural India (Jensen and Oster, 2009), that television has
decreased participation in social organizations in Indonesia (Olken, 2006) and that exposure to
soap operas in Brazil has reduced fertility (La Ferrara et al, 2008) and increased divorce rates
(Chong and La Ferrara, 2009).
The present paper develops a model of cultural transmission with two di¤erent cultural traits
where television plays the role of oblique socialization. In our model parents dispose of one unit of
free time which they have to split between educating their child which is costly or watching TV.
As in Bisin and Verdier (2001) time spent in education determines the probability that education
is successful and hence the probability of direct socialization. However, and this is our main inno-
vation, if direct socialization fails, the child is socialized by television. As in socialization analysis
(see Gerbner et al. 2002) we assume that the child is a¤ected by the entire system of messages
received by the television program. These messages consist of the amount of coverage of each
1Bisin and Verdier (2010) provide a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical contributions to the
literature.
2In the most standard approach (see e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2001) the probability to acquire a cultural trait
via oblique transmission equals its proportion in the population, hence the inuence of a trait through society
depends on its size. Saez-Marti and Sjögren (2008) have generalized the oblique cultural transmission function by
formalizing merit-guided learning on part of the children by their peers. Other papers have modelled education by
schools as additional forms of oblique transmission (see e.g. Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002).
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cultural trait which determines the probability that the child will adopt this trait conditionally
on being socialized by television. Hence, while parents enjoy watching television due to its enter-
tainment value, they are aware that television might infect the child with the "wrong" cultural
values.3
The television industry is free to air and nanced by advertisement. While it is not interested
in the propagation of cultural values per se, cultural coverage determines the viewing time of the
di¤erent cultural traits. Hence, the television industry strategically chooses the coverage of each
cultural trait in order to maximize its advertisement revenues. The two cultural groups di¤er in
size, in the strive for preserving their trait and in the sensitivity towards advertisement.
We use the model to address the following questions: how much time do parents spend edu-
cating their children? And how much time are children left watching television? How does the
television industry decide the coverage of the di¤erent cultural traits? What is the e¤ect on the
evolution of cultural traits over time? Under which conditions will both cultural traits survive in
the long-run? How does competition in the television industry a¤ect the long-run preservation of
traits?
The answer to these questions depends on how large is the televisions entertainment value
relative to the importance of keeping ones trait. If the cultural distance between the two groups
is small so that a trait change is not perceived as very costly and the entertainment value of
watching television is large, a monopolistic media industry can choose a coverage mix that totally
satises both groups which will end up watching television all the time and which will survive in
the long-run.
If instead the entertainment value is relatively small and the cultural distance is large, in-
creasing the time one group is watching television implies a decrease in the time the other group
3To keep the model tractable, we abstract from other forms of socializations like inuence by peers or by the
school. This simplication is not important, if the socialization of children occurs at a very young age when the
child is mainly under parential inuence.
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is watching TV. In this case, a monopolistic media industry chooses to capture more TV time
from the most protable group. We show that the protability of a group and also its cover-
age increases in its size, advertisement sensitivity and cultural radicalness. Moreover, exclusive
coverage of one trait is not necessary for the media industry to capture all the free time of that
group. Indeed, the optimal coverage is always interior. We show that there are two possible steady
states which we refer to as (a) and (b). In steady state (a) trait 1 parents make an education
e¤ort, while trait 2 parents who get more coverage watch TV all the time. The size of group 1
is smaller than in steady state (b) where trait 1 parents get more coverage and hence watch TV
all the time and trait 2 parents invest in education. If a cultural group is su¢ ciently insensitive
to advertisement only the steady state in which this group invests in education can be reached.
For intermediate advertisement sensitivities also the degree of cultural radicalness plays a role and
convergence might be totally determined by the initial sizes of the groups. However, the more
culturally aggressive is the group, the more likely it is to end up in a steady state in which its
size is bigger. In other words, increasing the relative advertisement sensitivity of one group with
respect to the other and/or its relative cultural radicalness, increases the probability of moving to
a steady state in which this group is larger.
The analysis so far has relied on a monopolistic media industry where the size of the groups
will typically change over the transition period to the steady state but both groups survive in
the long-run: this totally changes if there is competition. If a group is particularly sensitive to
advertisement relatively to the other, then, a competitive media industry will concentrate to cover
that group. Instead, for intermediate values of advertisement sensitivity each media rm will cover
a di¤erent group. Moreover, a decrease in the size of a group or in how radical it is will decrease
the probability that the media industry will concentrate to cover that group. This behavior by the
media industry will cause more extreme dynamics with respect to the monopolistic case for big
di¤erences in the groupsoverall protability (advertisement sensitivity, group size and cultural
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radicalness) but less extreme dynamics if those di¤erences are small. Specically, either one group
will get totally wiped o¤the map or there will be no change at all and the steady state will coincide
with the initial size of the groups.
Our analysis also produces many testable predictions: i) on the time spent by each cultural
group watching television and educating their children; ii) on the coverage of each cultural trait
both by the monopolistic and by the competitive media industry; iii) on the dynamics of cultural
traits in the presence of a monopolistic or in the presence of a competitive media industry. While
some evidence for these predictions will be discussed in the concluding section, a full-edged
empirical investigation is left for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and
motivates our main modelling assumptions. In section 3 we present the model. Section 4 solves for
the parents optimal time allocation between education and watching television. Section 5 derives
the coverage of cultural traits with a monopoly industry. Section 6 solves for the dynamics.
Section 7 extends the model and the results to a competitive media industry. Section 8 discusses
the empirical predictions and concludes. All proofs not following immediately from the main text
are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related literature and motivating evidence
Our model is based on three crucial assumptions: (i) television can lead to cultural changes, (ii)
the inuence of TV is bigger the more time children spend watching TV (iii) parents are aware of
this possibility and act accordingly. In what follows we provide some motivating evidence for these
assumptions. Empirical evidence by economists on assumption (i) was already briey mentioned
in the introduction. We will expand on it in Section 2.2. First, we will talk about insights from
communication scientists.
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2.1 The communication science literature
Communication scientists have long been studying how television a¤ects culture (see e.g. Shanahan
and Morgan, 1999) and have emphasized that the central role of television in our society makes
it the primary channel of mainstreaming our culture (Gerbner et al, 2002). They labeled their
eld of studies Cultivation Theorybecause exposure to television over time cultivates viewers
perceptions of reality. They argue that Television is the source of the most broadly shared
images and messages in history...Television cultivates from infancy the very predispositions and
preferences that used to be acquired from other primary sources ... The repetitive pattern of
televisions mass-produced messages and images forms the mainstream of a common symbolic
environment (Gerbner et al. (1986) p. 17 18). One of the central hypothesis in cultivation
research coincides with our assumption (ii), namely that heavy TV viewers are more likely to be
socialized by television than light viewers. This hypothesis was successfully tested by Gerbner
already in 1968 for three categories of TV viewers in the US: light viewers (less than 2 hours a
day), medium viewers (24 hours a day) and heavy viewers (more than 4 hours a day). At the
same time Gerbner established the Cultural Indicators Research Project to document trends in
television content and how these changes a¤ect viewersperceptions of the world.
The e¤ect of TV imports has also been studied. For the Philippines Tan et al. (1987) showed
that heavy viewers of American television evidenced non-traditional values, more like those shown
by the television programs than the traditional values of their Philippine homeland. Viewers in
Australia had di¤erent views of Australian life if they watched more American television (Pingree
and Hawkins, 1981). Tan and Suarchavarat (1988) provide evidence that the Thai people are
becoming more vindictive and are abandoning the traditional forgiveness derived from Buddhism
because of Chinese and Japanese television inuences.
The above evidence suggests that TV can lead to cultural change and that its inuence is
stronger for heavier viewers. But are parents aware of this? One of the most extreme examples
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of parents worrying that their culture might be destroyed by television is found in Granzberg et
al.s (1977) study of the Cree culture: The people who are most traditional in Cree society refuse
to have TV in their homes or feel it necessary to destroy a newly bought TV, or at least refuse to
allow their children to watch scary programs. The Cree clearly fear that their culture might be
destroyed by television and they care su¢ ciently that their only strategy is complete avoidance.
2.2 The economic literature on TV and cultural change
In more recent years, also economists have documented that the messages received by television
may a¤ect a large spectrum of beliefs and behaviors. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) nd that being
exposed to television programs in the Islamic world has an e¤ect on the way people judge the west.
Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) show that Fox News Channel has an important role in explaining
votes in the US. Dahl and Della Vigna (forthcoming) study the e¤ect that violent movies have
on US crime rates. Other papers by economists address the role of television on socioeconomic
outcomes in developing countries. La Ferrara et al. (2008) study the e¤ects of television on fertility
choices in Brazil and nd that women living in areas covered by the Globo signal have signicantly
lower fertility.4 Chong and La Ferrara (2009) nd that the share of women who are separated or
divorced increases signicantly after the Globo signal becomes available. Jensen and Oster (2009)
using data on ve Indian states show that the entry of cable TV led to increases in subjective
measures of female autonomy and declines in pregnancy rates. Finally, Olken (2006) studies the
e¤ect of radio and television on social capital in Indonesia and nds that increased signal reception,
which leads to more time watching television and listening to the radio, is associated with less
participation in social organizations and with lower self-reported trust.
4Globo is a network that had a virtual monopoly on telenovelas in Brasil.
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3 The model
We consider a society with overlapping generations and an innitely lived media industry. Each
generation is assumed to have size 1 and is made up by two possible cultural traits: a fraction n of
individuals has trait 1 and a fraction 1  n of individuals has trait 2. All individuals live for two
periods: when young they acquire their preferences; when old they have a child and have to decide
how to split their time between educating their child and watching television. The media industry
which for the time being is assumed to be a monopoly maximizes its revenue from advertisement
and has to decide the coverage of each cultural trait.
We normalize the individualsamount of time to 1 and denote by ti the amount of time devoted
by a parent of trait i to the education of his child. We will refer to ti as the parents education
e¤ort which contributes to determine the probability that their own cultural trait is transmitted
to the child. Parents have a preference for their own cultural trait, that is, V ii > V ij where V ii
and V ij are the value a parent of trait i gives to his child having trait i and j respectively. While
education increases the probability that the child is of the same cultural trait than the parent,
it is a costly activity and its cost is given by c(ti) = 12ct
2
i . The remainder of the time 1   ti; is
dedicated to watching TV. We assume that individuals get entertainment value  from watching
TV.5 However, the danger of watching television is that the child might get infected by the
cultural values transmitted by the television program leading to a trait change. In other words,
if direct socialization fails, the child is socialized by the TV.6 Hence, watching TV can lead to a
trait change, the probability of which depends on the coverage of the di¤erent traits in TV. Let
5Children watch TV mainly at home. It is reasonable to assume that parental TV time is similar to child TV
time and that this activity is often synchronized within the household. Indeed, Cardoso et al. (2010) reveal the
widespread inuence of parental time use on the childs time use: in the three countries analyzed (France, Germany
and Italy) both the mothers and the fathers share of time spent watching TV has a positive impact on the share
of time the youngster allocates to that activity.
6This is our main innovation over Bisin and Verdier (2001) where there is no role for media and if education
fails a child randomly meets a member of the adult society and adopts his preferences.
8
qi denote the coverage of trait i and let q1+ q2 = 1. Then, (1  ti)qi is the probability that a child
who has not been successfully educated by his parent still acquires his parents trait by watching
TV while (1  ti) (1  qi) is the probability of a trait change. The parents maximization problem
is therefore given by
max
ti
(1  ti) + tiV ii + (1  ti)qiV ii + (1  ti)(1  qi)V ij   1
2
ct2i : (1)
The media industry decides the coverage of each cultural trait to maximize its revenue from
advertisement which is given by
 = max
q
1n (1  t1) + 2(1  n) (1  t2) ;
where i is the advertisement revenue of the media industry per unit of time spent by group i
watching television which we will refer to as group is advertisement sensitivity. Let 1 =  and
2 =  with  > 0: Hence,  describes the protability of a member of group 1 relative to a
member of group 2. For  < 1 advertisement to group 2 is less protable than to group 1, while
the opposite holds for  > 1. Under this characterization the media industry maximizes
 = max
q
 [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] : (2)
The precise sequence of events unfolds as follows: in an arbitrary period t the media industry
chooses the coverage of the cultural traits in society (content of programs); each member of the old
generation (adult) has a child (the new generation) that needs to be socialized because children are
born without any well-dened preferences. Each adult decides how to split his/her time between
educating the child and watching television. These choices together with the media coverage of
the traits determine the transmission of cultural values and lead to the socialization of the young
generation. Payo¤s both for individuals and for the media industry are realized. In period t + 1
children born at t become adults and replace the old generation that dies. The same sequence
follows with the only di¤erence that the size of the cultural groups might have changed.
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To characterize the equilibrium of this game, we rst identify the parents optimal education
e¤ort choice and the related time devoted to watching television. Then, we describe the coverage
of each cultural trait by the media industry. Finally, we characterize the steady states of the
economy.
4 Education or watching TV?
To identify the optimal education e¤ort choice and the related time devoted to watch television,
parents maximize (1) leading to education choice7
ti = max

Vi(1  qi)  
c
; 0

;
where Vi = V ii   V ij describes the importance for a group i parent to preserve his/her cultural
trait. To insure that the education e¤ort is always smaller or equal to 1; i.e., ti  1; we assume
c  Vi   .8 Moreover, education e¤ort is zero for Vi(1 qi) c  0, hence for any coverage
qi  qi = 1   Vi we have ti = 0: Therefore, to make the problem interesting, we also assume
that   Vi so that education is not zero for all possible qi. We can then rewrite the optimal
education e¤ort as
ti =
(
Vi(1 qi) 
c
if qi < qi = 1  Vi
0 if qi  qi = 1  Vi ;
(3)
and summarize the parametric restrictions in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 c  Vi     0.
To simplify notation we dene q1 = q and q2 = 1  q: Also dene V1 = V and V2 = V;
where the parameter  measures how important it is to keep the own cultural trait for one group
7It is immediate to see that the second-order condition for a maximum is satised.
8The case c < Vi  is trivial from a theoretical point of view. It implies no TV time for any q 6= 1 and hence
no trait change but also no TV coverage. However, empirically this case is interesting and we will come back to it
later.
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with respect to the other group. Without loss of generality we assume that it is relatively more
important for group 1 to keep its own trait than for group 2. Hence, we restrict our analysis to
0 <   1:9 Under this specication the optimal education e¤orts for both groups are
t1 =
(
V (1 q) 
c
if q < 1  
V
0 if q  1  
V
;
(4)
and
t2 =
(
V q 
c
if q > 
V
0 if q  
V
:
(5)
The above expressions illustrate how parents free-ride on trait transmission by television. A
high coverage of ones own trait, increasing the probability of keeping the trait, always implies
zero education e¤ort. Observe that
t1 = 0 and t

2 > 0 for q > max

1  
V
;

V

and
t1 > 0 and t

2 = 0 for q < min

1  
V
;

V

:
For intermediate levels of q such that
min

1  
V
;

V

 q  max

1  
V
;

V

;
we have to distinguish two possible cases depending on the parameter :
Case 1 If   
V  , we have that 1   V  V . Then, for 1   V  q  V , neither group
does any education and hence t1 = t

2 = 0. Notice that a lower bound to the range of the parameter
 is given by the second inequality in Assumption 1. Hence we will have zero education for both
groups when

V
<   
V    ; (6)
which recalling that   1 implies the parameter restriction V  2. In words, in Case 1; the
entertainment value of television is relatively high compared to the importance to keep ones trait.
9Then Assumption 1 boils down to c  V     V     0:
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Case 2 If  > 
V  ; we have that

V
< 1   
V
. Then, for 
V
 q  1   
V
; both groups
educate their children, that is, t1 > 0 and t

2 > 0. Hence, both groups will educate their children
for

V    <   1: (7)
This also implies that in Case 2 the entertainment value of television is relatively low compared to
the importance of keeping ones trait, i.e.
V  2: (8)
Proposition 1 summarizes the optimal parental choice between education and TV time.
Proposition 1 (Education and TV watching) The allocation of time between education and
TV watching depends on the relative distance between the entertainment value of television and
the importance to keep ones trait between the groups:
If (6) holds, this di¤erence is small and we have
t1 =
V (1  q)  
c
and t2 = 0 for q < 1 

V
;
t1 = t

2 = 0 for 1 

V
 q  
V
;
t1 = 0 and t

2 =
V q   
c
for q >

V
:
If (7) holds, this di¤erence is large and we have
t1 =
V (1  q)  
c
and t2 = 0 for q <

V
;
t1 =
V (1  q)  
c
and t2 =
V q   
c
for

V
 q  1  
V
;
t1 = 0 and t

2 =
V q   
c
for q > 1  
V
:
From the previous result we get some interesting empirically testable predictions which we
summarize below.
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Empirical Predictions 1 (TV watching) i) The time each group watches TV increases in
the coverage of its own cultural trait;
ii) TV watching is decreasing in the importance to keep ones own trait (V and V ) and
increasing both in the entertainment value,  and in the cost of education, c.
The intuitions for these empirical predictions are simple. Point i) says that the higher q, the
more trait 1 parents can substitute away from education because their children are more likely to
get the right trait by watching TV while trait 2 parents have to ght the increasing danger of a
trait change implied by a higher coverage of trait 1. Instead, point ii) says that an increase in the
importance to keep ones own cultural trait, V will increase the incentive to invest in education.
So does an increases of  for group 2, who now cares more about perserving its trait and hence
decreases TV time. Since people substitute from the less benecial to the more benecial activity,
an increase in the entertainment value of watching television or in the cost of educational e¤ort
will decrease the time devoted to education and increase television watching.
5 The monopolistic media industry
We now describe the coverage of each cultural trait by the media industry. We assume for the time
being that there is a monopolistic media industry which maximizes its revenue from advertisement
taking the parents optimal time allocation into account, that is it chooses the q that maximizes
(2) given (education1) and (education2). The TV coverage and the corresponding prots are
characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Media coverage and prots) The TV coverage and the corresponding prots
are as follows:
1. If (6) holds, then any 1  
V
 q  
V
is optimal. Both traits watch TV all the time and
 =  (n+ (1  n)).
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2. If (7) holds, only one trait will invest in education while the other trait watches TV all the
time. Moreover, the optimal coverage depends on the size of the groups. Specically, there
is a cuto¤
en = 
1 + 
= 1  1
1 + 
(9)
such that for n  en the optimal coverage is qa = 
V
, only trait 1 invests in education and
prots are
a = 

 (1  n) + n

c +  +    V
c

; (10)
while for n > en the optimal coverage is qb = 1   
V
; only trait 2 invests in education and
prots are equal to
b = 

n+  (1  n)

c+    V + 
c

: (11)
The intuition is simple. If (6) holds, for 1  
V
 q  
V
both traits watch TV all the time,
hence any coverage in this range is optimal. This happens because the cultural distance between
the two groups is small and the entertainment value of watching television is large compared to the
importance to keep ones trait. This allows the media industry to choose an optimal coverage mix
that totally satises both groups. If instead (7) holds, the entertainment value is relatively small
and the cultural distance large. Increasing the time one group watches TV implies decreasing the
time the other group watches TV. Therefore, the media industry chooses to capture more TV
time from the most protable group, where protability depends on the size of the group n, on
the relative advertisement sensitivity of the group ; and on how radical one group is compared
to the other . The greater the importance to group 2 parents to preserve their trait relative
to the importance to group 1 parents, the bigger must be the size of group 1 for the media to
be willing to switch coverage to capture full TV time by trait 1. In other words, the threshold
en = 1  1
1+
is increasing in  because the media industry would loose a lot of group 2s TV time
by not satisfying group 2 parents. The same argument applies to the advertisement sensitivity.
14
Figure 1 illustrates how the prots of the media industry change with n for xed  and .
Notice that b is always increasing in n; it is equal to  (1  t2) for n = 0 and reaches  for
n = 1: On the contrary, a is always decreasing in n; it is equal to  for n = 0 and decreases to
(1  t1)  for n = 1: For low n the media industry captures all television time of trait 2, however,
forgoing TV time from trait 1 becomes more and more expensive the more parents with this trait
are around. Similarly, capturing all TV time from trait 1 and foregoing TV time from trait 2
becomes more and more attractive the more of trait 1 parents are around. Finally, if we allow
 and/or  to vary also the switching point en will vary, as already explained in the previous
paragraph.
[include gure 1 around here]
The previous discussion provides us with some interesting empirically testable predictions
which we summarize below.
Empirical Predictions 2 (Media coverage)
i) An increase in the size of the group increases the probability that the group gets more cover-
age;
ii) For given group sizes, an increase in the relative advertisement sensitivity of one group with
respect to the other and/or an increase in its relative cultural radicalness increases the
probability that this group gets more coverage.10
10unless the group is so radical that it will never watch TV if q < 1, a possibility excluded by Assumption 1.
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6 Dynamics
The dynamics of the cultural trait is given by
nit+1 = nit (t

i + (1  ti )qi) + (1  nit)(1  t i)qi
= nit
 
ti + (t

 i   ti )qi

+ (1  t i)qi: (12)
Trait i parents will have a trait i child if education is successful (with probability ti ) or if education
fails (with probability 1 ti ) and their child is successfully socialized by television (with probability
qi). Moreover, some trait i individuals of the next generation will stem from those trait  i parents
(1   ni) who were unsuccessful at education and whose children were socialized by TV to trait i
(with probability (1  t i)qi).
A rst intuitive and general result is the following. Failure to cover a trait will lead to the
long-run elimination of the trait. Clearly, for qi = 0 the steady state converges to ni = 0 and for
qi = 1 the steady state converges to ni = 1.
In general for intermediate values of the coverage, the size of group i can increase, decrease or
remain constant, that is, nit+1 R nit whenever
nit
 
ti + (t

 i   ti )qi

+ (1  t i)qi R nit ;
or equivalently
nit Q
(1  t i)qi
1   ti + (t i   ti )qi :
Hence in steady state
ni =
(1  t i)qi
1   ti + (t i   ti )qi : (13)
The steady state when condition (6) holds is trivial since t1 = t

2 = 0, hence n
 = q with
1  
V
 q  
V
.
Lets now turn to the case when (7) holds. In this case the media industry will either implement
qa = 
V
or qb = 1   
V
: Using the equilibrium values for TV watching which correspond to qa
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and qb (Proposition 1), we nd the two steady states candidates
na =
c
V
c V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
 (14)
and
nb = 1 
c
V
c  V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
 : (15)
A useful intermediate result is the following.
Lemma 1 Both @n

a
@
< 0 and @n

b
@
< 0:
The intuition for the result is as follows. A higher  makes group 2 more culturally aggressive,
leading to a bigger size for group 2 in steady state. Correspondingly, the size of group 1 as
described by na or n

b has to shrink.
Notice that these potential steady states are always interior.11 Also, they are independent of
the advertisement sensitivity  because neither coverage qa=qb nor optimal TV time depend on .
To understand which of the two candidates steady states is an equilibrium we check if for na and
nb the TV industry indeed chooses q
a and qb respectively. Hence, we check the location of na and
nb with respect to the threshold en dened by (9) and determine which of the following scenarios
can occur.
1. If na  en  nb was possible then both na and nb would be stable. The dynamics would
converge to na if the initial n0 < en and to nb otherwise.
2. If both na and n

b were smaller than en then the system would converge to na. Indeed, if
the initial n0  en the media industry would always implement qa. Instead, if the initial
n0 > en, qb would be implemented causing a reduction in n (because nb < n0). However,
since cultural trait 1 would be shrinking there would be a period t at which nt  en and the
media industry would switch to implementing coverage qa.
11For 0 < na < 1 we need c >
V  
 = V       while for 0 < nb < 1 we need c > V      . Both
conditions are guranteed by Assumption 1.
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3. If both na and n

b were bigger than en then the system would converges to nb . Indeed, if the
initial n0  en the media industry would always implement qb. Instead, if n0 < en, initially
qa would be implemented causing n to increase (because na > n0) and since cultural trait 1
would be growing there would be a period t at which nt  en and the media industry would
switch to qb.
4. Finally, if nb < en < na was possible, then both na and nb would be unstable. Whenever n >en the media industry would implement qb causing n to shrink. But whenever n has shrunk
su¢ ciently, so that n  en; the media industry would switch to qa so that n would increase
leading at some point to the optimality of qb and so on.
We will now show that complete instability (case 4) is never an equilibrium outcome and derive
the parameter conditions on  and  for which cases 1, 2 and 3 occur. The results are summarized
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Steady states) For all  satisfying condition (7), there exist thresholds a; b;
c; a and b; (all given in the appendix) such that the steady states are as follows:
1. for  < a the system converges to nb ;
2. for a    b the system converges to nb for min   < a while for a    max the
system converges to na whenever the initial n0 < en and converges to nb otherwise;
3. for b <   c we get the following subcases:
(a) for min   < a the system converges to nb ;
(b) for a    b the system converges to na whenever the initial n0 < en and converges
to nb otherwise;
(c) for b <   max the system converges to na.
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4. for  > c the system converges to na:
In steady state na the media industry chooses coverage q
a and only trait 1 invest in education. In
steady state nb the media industry chooses coverage q
b and only trait 2 parents invest in education.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3. The picture illustrates that nb can only be an equilibrium
if group 2 is not too sensitive to advertisement (there is an upper bound on ). Moreover, if
group 2 becomes more culturally radical (higher ), this change must be accompanied by a lower
advertisement sensitivity and vice versa. This happens because higher  and  make group 2 more
valuable for the media industry relative to group 1. Hence, if the product of these values becomes
too high the media industry would like to capture group 2s entire TV time resulting in na.
include gure 2 (equilibria) around here
The gure nicely illustrates that for any xed  > min as  increases the steady state will
change from nb to a region where convergence depends on the initial size of the groups and nally
to na. However, the existence of the region where convergence depends on the initial size of the
groups is only possible if na < en < nb . Since for all  > min there always exist some values of 
such that the region is not empty, we must have that na < n

b always. At min itself, n

a = n

b and
coincides with en at c. This establishes Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 na  nb for all permitted . The inequality is strict if  6= min.
We can therefore derive the following empirical predictions.
Empirical Predictions 3 (Cultural trait dynamics) Increasing the relative advertisement sen-
sitivity of one group with respect to the other and/or its relative cultural radicalness, increases the
probability of moving to a steady state in which this group is larger.
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7 Competitive media industry
We now modify the previous model to allow for a competitive media industry. Specically, consider
an innitely lived media industry made up by two rms/channels, I and II; who are interested in
maximizing their revenue from advertisement and have to decide the coverage of each cultural trait.
Having the choice, individuals will now decide both their preferred channel and how much time
to watch TV. Being afraid that the child might get infectedby the cultural values transmitted
by the television programs, parents will choose the channel that gives a higher coverage to their
own trait. Let qIi and q
II
i denote the coverage of trait i by channel I and II respectively. Then,
the parents maximization problem in (1) is unchanged except that now qi = max

qIi ; q
II
i
	
:
Both channels simultaneously decide the coverage of each cultural trait. Each channel j; taking
as given the choice of the other channel  j, decides the coverage qj to maximize its revenue from
advertisement given by


n (1  t1) 1qj>q j + (1  n) (1  t2) 1qj<q j +

n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)
2

1qj=q j

: (16)
The education e¤orts for both groups are as in (4) and (5) except that now q = max

qI ; qII
	
:
As before t1 and t

2 are included between zero and 1; t

1 is non-decreasing in q while t

2 is non-
increasing in q.
We now describe the coverage of each cultural trait by the media industry.
Proposition 5 (Competitive media coverage) If  <  there is only one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with qI = qII = 1; while if  >  the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium is qI = qII = 0
where
 =
n
(1  n)  1 + V 
c
 < n
1  n and  =
n
 
1 + V 
c

(1  n) >
n
1  n . (17)
For  <  < , there are only two pure strategy Nash equilibria (qI = 0; qII = 1) and (qI =
1; qII = 0). At  and ; besides the pooling equilibria (qI = qII = 1) at  and (qI = qII = 0) at
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 there are also the two separating equilibria (qI = 0; qII = 1) and (qI = 1; qII = 0): Finally, for
the equal protability point ( = n
1 n), there are an innite number of equilibria.
If a group is particularly sensitive to advertisement with respect to the other, that is if  is
smaller than  or is larger than , then, the media industry will concentrate to cover that group.
Instead, for intermediate values of the advertisement sensitivity parameter ; each channel will
cover a di¤erent group. If n = 0; then  =  = 0 hence the only equilibrium will be qI = qII = 0
for any : If, instead, n = 1; then  =  = +1 and the only equilibrium will be qI = qII = 1:
Notice that the thresholds in Proposition 5 can be rewritten in terms of group size. Indeed,  < 
implies
n > n =
 (c+ V   )
 (c+ V   ) + c; (18)
while  >  implies
n < n =
c
c+ c+V    : (19)
Hence, for intermediate group sizes the media industry will specialize on di¤erent traits. It is
instructive to study when specialization is most likely to occur. First, notice that only n is
a¤ected by  and it is increasing in , making specialization most likely for  = 1 when both
groups are equally radical. Moreover, the size of the interval for which specialization on di¤erent
traits occurs by the TV industry n   n is increasing for  < b, decreasing for  > b and largest
for  = b, where12
b = p(c   + V) (c   + V )
c   + V  :
Notice that for  = 1 we have that b = 1 as well. Indeed, this analysis uncovers that the thresholds
on n drift apart, the more equalthe groups are. If  < 1 meaning that group 1 is more radical
than group 2 than this must be countervailed by an higher sensitivity to advertisement (b > 1)
for group 2.
We can summarize the previous discussion in the following empirical predictions.
12For details on this derivation see the proof of Proposition 5.
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Empirical Predictions 4 (Competition and media coverage)
i) If a group is particularly protable the media industry will concentrate to cover that group.
Otherwise, all groups will be covered;
ii) A decrease in the size of a group, its advertisement sensitivity or its degree of cultural rad-
icalness will decrease the probability that the media industry will concentrate to cover that
group.
We now show that if we ignore the single point where  = n
1 n the dynamics is rather simple.
First, notice that, even if for  6  6  there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria (qI = 0; qII =
1) and (qI = 1; qII = 0), the two are equivalent in terms of coverage and hence in terms of dynamics.
Second, at  and ; besides the pooling equilibria (qI = qII = 1) at  and (qI = qII = 0) at
 there are also the two separating equilibria (qI = 0; qII = 1) and (qI = 1; qII = 0): However,
the separating equilibria are Pareto superior so we will concentrate on those. Hence, the steady
states are as follows.
Proposition 6 For  <  the system converges to n = 1: For  > ; instead, it converges to
n = 0: Finally, for  6  6  both cultural groups receive full coverage and are not a¤ected by the
other group, so that the steady state n is equal to the starting size no:
If a group is particularly sensitive to advertisement with respect to the other, that is if 
is smaller than  or is larger than ; then its trait will become the only one in society. For
intermediate values of the advertisement sensitivity parameter ; instead, each group will keep its
original size.
Empirical Predictions 5 (Competition and cultural trait dynamics) Competition in the
media industry gives more extreme dynamics (with respect to monopoly) if there are big di¤erences
in the groups sensitivity to advertisement but less extreme dynamics if those di¤erences are small.
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8 Discussion and Conclusion
Television does not only provide entertainment but is also an important source of oblique social-
ization. This paper translates this observation into a theoretical model in order to study both the
demand and supply side of television and its resulting inuence on cultural change. The model
derives three sets of predictions concerning: (i) TV demand (empirical Prediction 1), (ii) TV
supply (empirical Predictions 2 and 4) and (iii) the cultural dynamics and resulting steady states
(empirical Predictions 3 and 5).
On the demand side the model mainly predicts that TV time is increasing in cultural coverage
and decreasing in the importance to keep ones trait.13 There exists at least some indirect evidence
for this prediction. In the communication literature it is a well established fact that people like
home produced TV products more even if they are worse in quality. In other words, people watch
more television if the coverage of their cultural traits is larger. In the same vain, cultural proximity
has been shown to be a key factor for TV success (Trepete, (2003), Straubhaar (1991, 2008), La
Pastina and Straubhaar (2005), Straubhaar et al. (2003), de Bens and Schmaele (2001)). Imported
programs that are produced in a culture which is close in terms of language, dress, ethnic types,
body language, denitions of humor, ideas about story pacing, music traditions, religious elements
etc...tend to be more successful: Brazilian telenovelas dubbed into Spanish are more popular in
Latin America than any American Soap, while Japanese and Chinese television are more successful
in Asia than American imports, to mention a few examples.
Israel is an ideal country to study di¤erent cultural groupsviewing behaviors. Indeed, Cohen
(2005) and Cohen and Tukachinsky (2007) in their case study show that viewing patterns di¤er
13It also predicts that TV time is increasing in the entertainment value of TV and in the cost of education. The
former prediction would be shared by any model of TV demand and seems trivially true. The latter prediction is
just the other side of the coin: the cost of the alternative activity increases and hence its demand falls. However,
whether education is an important alternative activity to TV watching needs to be tested empirically. We are not
aware of any study looking at how the cost of time spent in educating children a¤ects TV viewing behavior.
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among groups and each group watches the channels that cover their culture better. Moreover,
they also look at the supply side and illustrate how the Israelian TV market has responded to
this demand by creating di¤erent niches for di¤erent cultures. In this market, all traits are covered
except for the ultra orthodox Jews who do not watch TV. This is in accordance with our model:
in Israel cultural groups are of similar sizes (protability) so that a competitive TV industry nds
it convenient to cover all of them except for the ultra orthodox Jews who are very insensitive to
advertisement.14 Moreover, it is extremely important for the ultra orthodox Jews to keep their
own trait, this motive is so dominant with respect to the possible entertainment value of TV and
to the cost of educating their children that their optimal choice is zero television (c +  < V )
unless there is full coverage. The optimal reaction by the supply side is not to cover this trait at
all due to its low advertisement sensitivity.
Cohen (2005) is the only paper (we are aware of) looking at the supply side that tries to
distinguish channels by their cultural coverage. All other papers studying the supply side of
television look at di¤erent measures of channel diversity, mainly based on the type of programs
that the channels transmit, and try to understand whether more competition leads to more or less
diversity. The empirical ndings are mixed: in some markets diversity seems to have increased, in
others declined (Signorielli (1986), De Jong and Bates (1991), Lin, (1995), Li and Chiang (2001),
Van der Wur¤ (2004, 2005)). Diversity measures can vary considerably across markets with
similar number of channels. These ndings can be made consistent with our model since the e¤ect
of competition on diversity depends on the relative protability of the di¤erent cultural groups.
Controlling for cultural aspects of programs and not only for program type, for group size and
advertisement sensitivity of di¤erent cultures can serve as an empirical strategy to disentangle this
mixed evidence, a possibility alluded to in Van der Wur¤ (2005) who suggests that the di¤erent
14Cultural groups in Israel consist of around 12% Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 18% Arabs, 20% immigrants from the
former Soviet Union while the remaining 50% is split among tradional-Mizrahi, secular-Ashkenazi and national
religious groups (Cohen, 2005).
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channel diversity might be due to di¤erences in audience demand for minority programmes,
country-specic (cultural-historical) di¤erences in channel programming or a combination of these
factors(p.267). All our other predictions concerning the supply side of television simply say that
the relatively more protable cultural group gets more coverage.15 While this seems intuitive, it
is interesting that protability does not only depend on group size and advertisement sensitivity
but also on cultural radicalness. More radical groups should get more coverage, unless they are
very insensitive to advertisement and so radical that they can only be induced to watch television
if their trait is fully covered. The empirical test of this prediction requires data on the relative
cultural dislike of one cultural trait towards the others and is left for future research.
The third set of predictions of our model concerns the cultural dynamics. Our model predicts
that under a monopolistic TV industry some cultural groups might get diminished in size but will
never be wiped o¤ the map. This can happen if the TV market is competitive, however, only if the
cultural group is not too radical not to watch any TV at all and is very insensitive to advertisement.
If these conditions are not satised, a competitive TV industry will have a smaller e¤ect on the
cultural distribution of traits than a monopoly.16 While we are not aware of any studies testing our
predictions directly,17 some e¤orts have been made to study cultural change over time. Inglehart
and Baker (2000) use three waves of the World Value Surveys including 65% of societies to show
both massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural values. Especially the
broad heritage of a society in terms of religion is shown to leave a deep imprint on values that
endure modernization. The role of the mass media is ignored in the study. However, in a recent
15A parallel argument could be made for commercial radios concentrating on the most protable groups. Siegel-
man and Waldfogel (2001) provide empirical evidence that US commercial radio mainly covers white audiences and
underprovides minority listeners (blacks and hispanics) who have a very distinctive taste.
16In our model the e¤ect of the competitive industry is zero because we have as many competitors as cultural
traits.
17The closest attempt might be due to Morgan (1986) who investigated the e¤ect of watching TV on regional
diversity in the US between 1975 and 1983 examining the General Social Surveys conducted by the National
Opinion Research Centre and discovered that heavy viewers had less regional diversity than light or moderate
viewers. Morgan (1986) did not nd any dynamic e¤ect for heavy viewers.
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book Norris and Inglehart (2009) take a rst look at the role of the media for cultural change again
using the World Value Survey. While Chapter 8 suggests a consistent relationship linking patterns
of media use with moral values, and this link is stronger in societies more open to information
ows across cultural borders, no evidence for convergence in values across countries world wide
could be established (Chapter 10). Norris and Inglehart (2009) expect cultural diversity to persist
for the foreseeable future and conclude that the risks to national diversity due to mass media
is exaggerated.18 Based on this risk the UNESCO passed the Universal Declaration of Cultural
Diversity in 2005: protectionist measures have also been passed by the European Union in the
2007 Audiovisual Media Service Directive.
Cultural extinction can occur in our model but only under special circumstances. Parental
concern about the survival of cultural traits acts as a rewall against cultural convergence. If
parents care about their culture, their children will only be allowed to watch television that gives
a su¢ cient coverage to their cultural trait. It is this aspect of the demand side that acts as an
insurance towards cultural survival and can make protectionist policies superuous. E.g. when
studying the Israeli TV market where all channels have quotas on Israeli productions, Cohen
(2005) discovered all commercial channels voluntarily surpassed these quotas because that was
what consumers demanded.
However, a serious conclusion concerning cultural convergence versus nonconvergence due to
mass media can only be given by an empirical test of our dynamic predictions. In order to do so,
one would need a long panel with data on peoples time use and values, together with data on TV
contents that allow for cultural di¤erentiation between channels. This very demanding task is left
for future research.
18Disdier et al. (2010) reach the same conclusion. In their paper they o¤er systematic evidence of the inuence of
foreign media on one particular cultural trait, namely naming patterns in France. Names given to babies are seen
as "emblematic characteristics of national cultural traditions" and hence "expressions of cultural identity". Disdier
et al. (2010) show that despite the existence of many examples of non-traditional names in France the aggregate
impact of foreign media is modest and has changed less than 5% of the names.
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The present paper only looked at free to air television and did not consider pay TV where media
platforms additionally to advertisement revenues receive direct revenues from viewers. Also, our
model of advertisement income was very simplistic. There is an economic literature comparing
pay-TV versus free-to-air TV. The most sophisticated studies using a model of two-sided markets
(TV and advertisement market) show that under pay-TV program quality is higher (Armstrong
and Weeds (2007)) and contents are more di¤erentiated (Peitz and Valletti (2008)). This suggests
that introducing pay TV when there is competition in the media industry into our model would
only improve the coverage of the di¤erent cultural traits. With this in mind, our model can be
interpreted as the worst case scenario for cultural survival. Another interesting extension is to
allow for rms to broadcast multiple channels and o¤er bundles. Crawford and Cullen (2007)
show in numerical welfare simulations that consumers would benet if cable television networks
were o¤ered à la carte. If cultural survival is a concern, this is likely to reinforce their conclusion.
Finally, if we allowed for public broadcasters (see e.g. Cabizza, (2001) and Rasch (2007)) who
also care about consumer welfare or even about cultural diversity, this would also work in favor of
cultural survival.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. If (6) holds, given the optimal education choices described by Lemma 1, it
is immediate to conclude that (2) will be maximized by any q 2 1  
V
; 
V
	
where both traits watch
TV all the time. Moreover, if 1  t1 = 1  t2 = 1; it is also immediate to see that  =  (n+ (1  n)).
If (7) holds, we proceed in the following way: rst we nd the optimal q for each subinterval described
in Lemma 1 and then we compare the level of prots in each subinterval to nd the overall optimal q:
For q < 
V
the optimal qa = 
V
since (1  t1) is increasing in q while (1  t2) is constant and
equal to 1. Using (4), (2) and qa = 
V
; prots are easily shown to be equal to (10).
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We now solve for the last subinterval where qb > 1  
V
. Given that (1  t1) is constant and equal
to 1, while (1  t2) is decreasing in q the optimal coverage mix is qc = 1  V and prots are equal to
(11).
Finally, in the second subinterval where 
V
 q  1  
V
the rm has to maximize
max

V
q1  
V


n

c+   V (1  q)
c

+ (1  n)

c+    V q
c

:
Since the problem is linear, we get a corner solution leading either to qa and a or to qb and b. It is
easy to show that a  b whenever n  en = 
1+
= 1  1
1+
.
Proof of Lemma 1. We use (14) and (15) to calculate
@na
@
=
c
V
0B@  12

c V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
  1


2V
 
1  
V


2V
+ 
2
2V


c V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
2
1CA
and
@nb
@
=
c
V
 V  1  
V
2
c  V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
2 ;
which are both negative.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof consists of a series of lemmas. We briey comment on the
strategy of the proof. The dynamics give us the conditions for stability: na is stable whenever n

a  en;
while nb is stable whenever en  nb . We rst translate these conditions into restrictions on the parameter
. Since both na and n

b are decreasing while en is increasing in ; the analysis will deliver a minimum
value a for na dened by (20) and a maximum value b for n

b dened by (21) to be stable. We then
examine for which values of  these two thresholds fall outside the permitted range of  as dened by
min and max in (7). From this exercise we learn the bounds on  for which na/n

b are always stable
(determined by a  min for na and by b  max for nb) and for which na/nb are always unstable
(determined by a > max for na and by b < min for n

b). It turns out that the condition for complete
instability for nb and for complete stability for n

a coincide at  > c dened by (24) which tells us that
whenever nb is completely unstable for all permitted , n

a is completely stable: we are in case 2. The
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conditions for complete instability of na; namely  < a dened by (22) and complete stability of n

b ;
namely  < b dened by (23) do not coincide, however it can be shown that a < b, so complete
instability of na (namely  < b) implies complete stability of n

b for all possible : we are in case 3. For
a    b we are also in case 3 for min <  < a and in case 1 for a <  < max. The remainder
of the proof establishes that a  b for b    c, hence we are in case 1 for a    b, in case 2
for b <   max and in case 3 for min   < a while case 4 never occurs.
Lemma 2 na  en whenever   a where
a =
  (2V   c  )  +
q
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )
2V (c+   V ) (20)
while en  nb whenever   b where
b =
(V   ) (c+ )
(V   )2 + c: (21)
Moreover both a and b are decreasing in .
Proof. We rst derive the condition for na  en. This is equivalent to

1 + 

c
V
c   1  
V
  
V  

 ;
which after some algebra gives
2V (c+   V ) +  (2V   c  )    ( + c)  0:
The general solution for  is
 =
  (2V   c  )  
q
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )
2V (c+   V ) :
However, given that by assumption 1 we have that (c+   V ) > 0 and that the expression under the
square bracket is always bigger than  (2V   c  ) , the correct solution is
  a =
  (2V   c  )  +
q
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )
2V (c+   V ) :
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Now we look at the condition for nb  en, namely
1 
c
V
c   1  
V

(V      ) 

1 + 
= 1  1
1 + 
:
Some algebra transforms it into a condition on 
  (V   ) (c+ )
(V   )2 + c = b:
While it is immediate to see that @b
@
< 0. To show that @a
@
< 0 notice that a can be rewritten as
a =   (2V   c  ) 
2V (c+   V ) +
q
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )
2V (c+   V ) :
Then,
@a
@
=
((2(2V c )22+4(2+c)V (c+ V )))2V (c+ V )
2
p
2(2V c )22+4(+c)V (c+ V )
(2V (c+   V ))2
 
q
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )2V (c+   V )
(2V (c+   V ))2 ;
the sign of which is equal to the sign of  8cV 2 (c+   V )2 < 0:
Lemmas 3 and 4 provide cuto¤ values for  such that na and n

b are always stable or always unstable.
Those are derived by comparing a and b to the bounds on  imposed by condition (7). Lemma 3 looks
at the upper bound and provides conditions for na to be always unstable and n

b to be always stable.
Lemma 3 a > max = 1, hence na is unstable for  < a with
a =
c
(V   )(c+ 2  V ) (22)
and b  max, hence nb is always stable for   b with
b =
(V   )(c+ 2  V )
c
: (23)
Moreover a < b.
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Proof. Using (20) we rewrite the condition for a > 1 as
 
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )
  (2V (c+   V ) +  (2V   c  ) )2 > 0;
which after some algebra simplies to
4V  (c+   V )  c + 22 +V 2+ c   cV   3V  > 0:
Since c+   V > 0 this requires
c + 22 +V 2+ c   cV   3V  > 0;
which can be rewritten as  < a =
c
(V )(c+2 V ) .
Next we check when b  1. This is equivalent to (V   ) (c+ )  (V   )2 c  0: After
isolating for  we get   b = (V )(c+2 V )c . It is easy to see that a < b since this requires
(2  V ) (c+   V ) < 0 which is always true since 2 < V (in Case 2) while by Assumption 1
the second bracket is positive.
Lemma 4 looks at the lower bound and provides conditions for nb to be always unstable and n

a to
be always stable.
Lemma 4 Both a < min = V  and b < min for  > c where
c =
(V   )2
2
: (24)
In this case nb is always unstable and n

a is always stable.
Proof. Using (20) we rewrite the condition for a < min as
(2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )) (V   )2
< (2V (c+   V )  + (V   ) (2V   c  ) )2 :
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Taking everything to the left hand and simplifying gives
4V  (c+   V )  V 2 + 2   2   2V  < 0:
By Assumption 1 the rst bracket is positive. Hence we need
 
V 2 + 2   2   2V  < 0 which
gives us the cuto¤  > c =
(V )2
2
. Similarly, b < min is equivalent to
(V )(c+)
(V )2+c <

V  ;which
can be reformulated as (V   )2 (c+ ) <   (V   )2 + c : Since V >  the condition
simplies to (V   )2 < 2 which gives us again  > c = (V )
2
2
:
Lemma 5 c > b.
Proof. It is easy to see that c =
(V )2
2
> (V )(c+2 V )
c
= b since this is equivalent to
c (V  ) > (c+ 2  V ); which can be reformulated as V > 2 something that is guaranteed
by (8).
From Lemma 4 we learnt that for  > c the system always converges to na. Lemma 3 tells us that
for  < a the system converges to nb always. Moreover, by Lemma 3 a  b for a    b.
Since na is unstable for  < a this tells us that for min   < a the system converges to nb while
for a    max both equilibria candidates are reachable depending on the initial n. To characterize
the steady states fully it remains to determine what happens for b <   c. In this area both steady
state candidates are sometimes reachable and sometimes unreachable. By establishing how a compares
to b the next lemma excludes the possibility of complete instability.
Lemma 6 For b <   c it is always the case that a < b.
Proof. We know that for b <  < c both a and b are interior with respect to the bounds dened
by (7). We rst compare a and b in general and then show that if they lie between min and max it
must be the case that b > a. After some reformulation a Q b is equivalent to
4V c (c+   V )  V 2 + 2   2   2V   
V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2 Q 0:
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By Assumption 1 the rst bracket is positive, hence we have to look at the second and third bracket only
 
V 2 + 2   2   2V    V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2 Q 0: (25)
Equation (25) tells us that there are two values of , say 1 and 2; for which a = b. Those values of
 can be calculated equating (25) to zero: The zero of the rst bracket of (25) gives 2 which happens
to coincide with c while the zero of the second bracket gives us 1. The rst bracket is positive 
V 2 + 2   2   2V  > 0 for  < c dened by (24) (see proof of Lemma 4) which is the
condition that both b > min and a > min. Hence we only need to sign 
V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2
=
 
(V   )2   2 (c + ) + V   2   c2 (26)
= (V   )2  +   c (V   )2 +  2   c2V   3  2c2: (27)
Hence, if we could prove that the sign is negative for b < max and a < max, we would have shown that
b > a. It is clear from (27) that the sign becomes negative for high . From Lemma 3 we know that
b < max requires  > b =
(V )(c+2 V )
c
> 1 > c
(V )(c+2 V ) = a. But the value of (26) at
 = 1 is given by  V (c+ ) (c+   V ) < 0 always. Hence, we can conclude that b > a. In
general, the proof shows that a < b if and only if 1 <  < 2.
The lemma implies that in this last area (b <   c) nb is the only stable steady state for  <
a, while na is the only stable steady state for  > b: In the middle region (a    b) the initial
condition n determines which state is reached. Proposition 3 collects all these results.
Proof of Proposition 5. We rst show that (qI = 0; qII = 1) and (qI = 1; qII = 0) are two pure
strategy Nash equilibria for all  6  6 : In those equilibria the channel (no matter which) covering
group 2 gets prots  (1  n) while the only protable deviation is to cover group 1 only which would
give prots 

n+(1 n)(1 t2)
2

where t2 =
V 
c
and this is not protable for  6 : For the channel
covering group 1, instead, prots are equal to n; while deviating to cover group 2 would give the prots


n(1 t1)+(1 n)
2

where t1 =
V 
c
and this is not protable for  6 :
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Next, we show that for  6 ; qI = qII = 1 is an equilibrium. Indeed, for qI = qII = 1 the only
possible deviations are for q < 1 which would guarantee prots  (1  n) to the deviating channel: Then,
qI = qII = 1 is an equilibrium if 

n+(1 n)(1 t2)
2

>  (1  n) ; that is if  6  = n
(1 n)(1+t2)
where
t2 =
V 
c
: We can similarly show that qI = qII = 0 is an equilibrium if 

n(1 t1)+(1 n)
2

> n;
that is if  >  = n(1+t

1)
(1 n) where t

1 =
V 
c
:
We now show that there are no other pure strategy Nash equilibria except for the equal protability
point ( = n
1 n). Assume there exist an equilibrium with q
I > qII (di¤erent from (qI = 1; qII = 0))
then channel I would get prots n (1  t1) and channel II would get prots  (1  n) (1  t2) : This
is never an equilibrium for (1  t1) and/or (1  t2) smaller than 1: In that case I and/or II could
deviate and get a larger audience by increasing qI and/or decreasing qII : This is always true since t1
is non-increasing in q while t2 is non-decreasing in q and there are some q such that t

1 = t

2 = 0: If
instead, (1  t1) and (1  t2) both equal 1; again this cannot be an equilibrium, except for the single
point where  = n
1 n : Indeed, the channel that gets viewers from the less protable group, for  >
n
1 n
channel I; would prot from deviating to a qI < qII because would get  (1  n) which is more than
the candidate equilibrium payo¤ n. Notice that this reasoning does not work if qII is already equal to
zero as in (qI = 1; qII = 0). Similarly, channel II would deviate if  < n
1 n : A similar reasoning shows
that there is never an equilibrium for qI < qII except for  = n
1 n :
Assume now that there exist an equilibrium with qI = qII (di¤erent from qI = qII = 1 and
qI = qII = 0) then both channels would get prots 

n(1 t1)+(1 n)(1 t2)
2

: In this case the best
possible deviation would be to satisfy completely (1   ti = 1) the most protable group. Therefore, if
 < n
1 n ; that is group 1 is the more protable group, a deviation to a q > q
I = qII would give to the
deviating channel a prot of n: Then, qI = qII will be an equilibrium if 

n(1 t1)+(1 n)(1 t2)
2

> n
and this is not possible for  < n
1 n even if (1  t1) = (1  t2) = 1: If, instead, we assume that the most
protable group is number 2; i.e.,  > n
1 n ; then a deviation to a q < q
I = qII would give to the deviating
channel a prot of  (1  n) ; which can be shown to be always bigger than 

n(1 t1)+(1 n)(1 t2)
2

if
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 > n
1 n :
If the two groups are equally protable, that is  = n
1 n ; there are an innite number of equilibria
with qI 6= qII all such that each channel gets all the time of one group, i.e., with (1  t1) = (1  t2) = 1:
Clearly, if (1  ti ) < 1 the channel covering the group could deviate to a lower (or higher q): However, all
coverages such that each channel covers completely one group (of equal protability) is an equilibrium.
The complete list of such equilibria is given by all the couple (qi; qj) such that qi 2 1  
V
; 1

and
qj 2 0; 
V

; with the further restriction that the coverage of group 1 is greater than the coverage of
group 2; i.e., qi > qj: Moreover, for  = n
1 n we also have a continuum of equilibria with q
I = qII when
(1  t1) = (1  t2) = 1: This is possible when parameters are such that 1  V < V as in Case 1.
We now show what happens to the size of the interval for which specialization on di¤erent cultural
traits occurs once we rewrite the thresholds  and  in terms of group sizes, that is, n = (c+V )
(c+V )+c 
n  c
c+c+V  = n: The size of the interval is
n  n = 
 
2   2c + cV + V 2  V  + cV   V 
(c+ c   + V ) (c   +V + c) :
The term in brackets at the numerator can be rewritten as (c+V   ) (V   ) + c(V   ) and
is positive (Assumption 1). Hence, the sign of the derivative with respect to the advertisement sensitivity
 is equal to the sign of the following expression: c (c   +V   c2 + 2   V 2) which is zero
for  = b = p(c +V)(c +V )
c +V  , implying that n   n is increasing for  < b, decreasing for  > b
and largest for  = b.
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Figure 1: Changes of the prots of the media industry with n
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Figure 2: Convergence to steady states with a monopolistic TV industry
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